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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Discovery was Improperly Denied and the Petition was Improperly Dismissed 
Mr. Plaster set out in his Opening Brief why the district court erred in denying him 
discovery which thereby led to his petition being summarily dismissed in violation of his state 
and federal constitutional rights including his right to access to the courts, Idaho Const. Art. I, § 
18, U.S. Const. Amends. 1 and 14, and his right to due process. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13, U.S. 
Const. Amends. 5 and 14. Appellant's Opening Brief pages 6-11. 
In response, the State has argued first that a request for all district court records and 
documents in a particular case is not a sufficiently specific discovery request citing Aeschliman v. 
State, 132 Idaho 397,402,973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999). The State has further argued that 
"it is unclear why Plaster would be entitled to information from a criminal case that was not the 
subject of his post-conviction petition." Respondent's Brief at page 8, referencing the district 
court cases CR-2005-2906 and CR-2008-249. 
With regard to the State's first argument, as set out in Mr. Plaster's Opening Brief at 
pages 2-4 and 8-10, Mr. Plaster's request for discovery was sufficiently specific. 
With regard to the State's assertion that it is unclear why Mr. Plaster would be entitled to 
discovery in Case No. CR-2005-2906, the record resolves any confusion. As set out in State v. 
Plaster, Docket No. 36119, unpublished opinion filed August 9, 2010 (the appeal in the 
underlying criminal cases), CR-2005-2906 was consolidated with CR-2008-249, and the cases 
remained consolidated and were resolved by a joint plea agreement. In fact, on direct appeal the 
issue was whether the district court erred in ruling that the State could use Mr. Plaster's 
admissions made during the psychosexual evaluation in Case No. CR-2005-2906 in its 
1 
prosecution of Case No. CR-2008-249. 1 
The State is precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from arguing that it is unclear 
why the record from Case No. CR-2005-2906 is relevant to a post-conviction petition in case 
CR-2008-249, given that it argued (and prevailed) in the district court that the admissions 
obtained in the psychosexual evaluation in case No. CR-2005-2906 should be admitted in a trial 
in case CR-2008-249. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one 
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P .3d 492, 502 (2004). The Idaho Supreme 
Court adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 
277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). 
As explained by the Court of Appeals, there are very important reasons behind the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel: 
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by 
protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity 
of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from 
playing fast and loose with the courts. 
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted) cited with favor in A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho at 685, 
116P.3dat 15. 
The State cannot now take a position opposite to its position in the district court regarding 
the relevance of the records of case CR-2005-2906 to case CR-2008-249 and thus to the petition 
1 Mr. Plaster filed a motion to augment the record and take judicial notice in this case of 
the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Plaster, No. 36119, on May 20, 2013. In addition, a 
copy of the opinion is attached as an appendix to this brief. 
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at issue in this case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Plaster requests that the 
order dismissing his case be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to grant his 
discovery request and allow him to make a meaningful response to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this 10~ay of May, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Jonathan 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 36119 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 582 
Filed: August 9, 2010 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
JONATHAN GEORGE PLASTER, JR., THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia 
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 
Order granting motion in limine and judgments of conviction and sentences, 
affirmed. 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy 
Appellate Public Def ender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
GRATTON, Judge 
Jonathan George Plaster, Jr., appeals from his judgments of conviction entered upon 
conditional guilty pleas to seven counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen, 
Idaho Code § 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, 
I.C. § 18-1506. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In September 2005, Plaster was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a child 
under the age of sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years. 
The parties reached a plea agreement and the district court agreed to be bound by it, pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11. Plaster entered a conditional Alford1 plea of guilty to one count of lewd 
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaster's contention on appeal is as follows: 
Mindful of the fact that Mr. Plaster's participation in the psychosexual 
evaluation in the First Case was not required as part of the plea agreement with 
the State and would not factor into his sentence in any way, and mindful of the 
fact that Mr. Plaster moved to withdraw his plea and, thereby, knowingly 
withdrew from his plea agreement with the State, Mr. Plaster nevertheless 
contends that, because the admissions made during the psychosexual evaluation 
were made in reliance on the original plea agreement, it was fundamentally unfair 
for the district court to have ruled that the State could use those admissions 
against him even after the plea agreement had been vacated. 
Plaster asserts only fundamental unfairness in admitting evidence of the statements made during 
the psychosexual evaluation. Plaster cites no Idaho precedent regarding application of 
fundamental fairness principles to the decision to admit or deny evidence. Aside from the 
statement quoted above, Plaster makes no argument as to how the admission of the evidence 
would be fundamentally unfair or how the district court erred in its analysis of this issue. 
Instead, Plaster cites, as "cf." two cases, United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 62-64 (1st 
Cir. 2003) and United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1992). 
In Ventura-Cruel, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ventura-Cruel was required to provide 
complete and truthful information about his crime and involvement in a drug conspiracy. In 
order to receive a reduction in sentence, Ventura-Cruel had to accept responsibility and provide 
incriminating information. The court advised him at the change of plea hearing that he was 
waiving his right against self-incrimination. Thereafter, Ventura-Cruel wrote a confession letter 
to his probation officer. Ventura-Cruel did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district 
court later rejected his guilty plea. The district court allowed the letter into evidence. The 
appellate court determined that, based upon the facts, allowing the letter into evidence would be 
fundamentally unfair. Ventura-Cruel had reasonably relied on the existence of the plea 
agreement before making his admissions. In fact, he had been advised that he had waived his 
right against self-incrimination and had been, by the terms of the plea agreement, required to 
provide incriminating information. In addition, Ventura-Cruel had not asked to have the plea 
withdrawn or otherwise lose the benefits of the plea agreement. Thus, under the circumstances, 
admitting the letter would deprive him of the benefit of the agreement, yet place the government 
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in a better position. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d at 62-63. Similarly, in Escamilla, the defendant 
was required, by a plea agreement, to make incriminating statements regarding his role in a drug 
conspiracy and, after he made incriminating statements but failed a polygraph, the government 
withdrew from the agreement. Again, the court determined that using the admissions would 
deny him the benefit of the bargain and place the government in a superior position. Escamilla, 
975 F.2d at 571-72. 
By contrast, here, Plaster entered an Alford plea and was not required to and did not 
admit or accept responsibility for the underlying crimes charged. Plaster was advised of his 
rights before making the admissions. There were no provisions in the plea agreement which 
induced Plaster to make incriminating statements. Plaster, not the State, voluntarily withdrew 
from the plea agreement. Further, the district court determined that the statements were 
voluntarily made. Plaster has failed to demonstrate or provide relevant authority for his claim 
that admission of the evidence was erroneous on the ground that such admission would be 
fundamentally unfair. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaster has not demonstrated error in admitting into evidence the statements made in the 
psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, the district court's order granting the State's motion in 
limine, and Plaster's judgments of conviction and sentences are affirmed. 
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON, CONCUR. 
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